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THE MONIST. 
THE REALITIES OF EXPERIENCE. 
GREAT IN MANY WAYS, Huxley was perhaps greatest as an essayist. To this end he applied three conspicuous gifts, 
^-an eye for essentials, lucidity of thought, and style. Original 
research had provided him with a solid basis of first-hand knowl-
edge in his special branch of science. Wide reading and a ten-
acious memory furnished him with abundant material for apt and 
forcible illustration. H e knew the public whom he addressed and 
felt its pulse with admirable skill. He had a mission and a mes-
sage. He stood forth as the champion of science and of a negative 
philosophy founded thereon. It is one aspect of that philosophy 
I propose to consider. 
Towards the close of the essay on Descartes's Discourse on 
Method Huxley said :* 
'' The reconciliation of physics and metaphysics lies in the acknowledgment of 
faults upon both sides; in the confession by physics that all the phenomena of 
nature are in their ultimate analysis known to us only as facts of consciousness; in 
the admission by metaphysics that the facts of consciousness are, practically, inter-
pretable only by the methods and the formulae of physics; and, finally, in the ob-
servance by both metaphysical and physical thinkers of Descartes's maxim—assent 
to no proposition the matter of which is not so clear and distinct that it cannot be 
doubted." 
In two subsequent essays, and elsewhere incidentally, Huxley 
interpreted and fully accepted the Berkeleyan analysis of sensation 
Collected Essays, I. p. 194. 
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2 THE MONIST. 
and perception. Starting with the prick of a pin, which subtly 
transforms itself on the next page into a needle, and passing to the 
smell, taste, and visible appearance of the orange, without which, 
as part of his stock in trade, no one who has a due respect for tra-
dition would attempt to deal with the problem, he leads up to the 
position which Locke thus summarised :l 
"F lame is denominated hot and light; snow, white and cold; and manna, 
white and sweet, from the ideas they produce in us; which qualities are commonly 
thought to be the same in these bodies that those ideas are in us; the one the per-
fect resemblance of the other as they are in a mirror; and it would by most men 
be judged very extravagant if one should say otherwise. And yet, he that will 
consider that the same fire that at one distance produces in us the sensation of 
warmth, does at a nearer approach produce in us the far different sensation of 
pain, ought to bethink himself what reason he has to say that his idea of warmth 
which was produced in him by the fire, is actually in the fire; and his idea of pain 
which the same fire produced in him in the same way, is not in the fire. Why are 
whiteness and coldness in snow, and pain not, when it produces the one and the 
other idea in us; and can do neither but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion 
of its solid par ts?" 
H a v i n g t h u s , in c o m p a n y w i t h L o c k e , d i s p o s e d of a n y c l a i m 
t o e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y w h i c h t h e s e s o - c a l l e d " s e c o n d a r y q u a l i t i e s " m a y 
b e s u p p o s e d t o p o s s e s s , H u x l e y t h e n p r o c e e d s t o a p p l y t h e B e r k e -
l e y a n l o g i c t o t h e " p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s . " L o c k e h a d sa id :2 
" T h e particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire and 
snow are really in them, whether any one's senses perceives them or not, and 
therefore they may be called real qualities because they really exist in those bodies; 
but light, heat, whiteness or coldness are no more really in them than sickness or 
pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or 
colors, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste nor the nose smell; and 
all colors, tastes, odors, and sounds, as they are such particular ideas, vanish and 
cease, and are reduced to their causes, i. e., bulk, figure, and motion of parts." 
B u t a s H u x l e y , i n t e r p r e t i n g B e r k e l e y , g o e s o n t o s h o w , a r i g -
o r o u s e x t e n s i o n of t h e l o g i c w h i c h d i s p o s e s of t h e s e c o n d a r y q u a l i -
t i e s , f o r ce s u s t o a d m i t t h a t t h e p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s a r e in l i ke c o n -
d e m n a t i o n . S o t h a t t h e final u p s h o t i s t h i s : 
1
 Quoted in Collected £ssays, Vol. VI. pp. 253-254. 
2
 Quoted Vol. VI. p. 255. 
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THE REALITIES OF EXPERIENCE. 3 
' ' If the materialist affirms that the universe and all its phenomena are resolv-
able into matter and motion, Berkeley replies: ' True ; but what you call matter 
and motion are known to us only as forms of consciousness; their being is to be 
conceived or known; and the existence of a state of consciousness, apart from a 
thinking mind, is a contradiction in terms.' (P. 279.) 
" Our sensations, our pleasures, our pains, and the [relations of them make up 
the sum total of positive, unquestionable knowledge. We call a large section of 
these sensations and their relations matter and motion; the rest we term mind and 
thinking; and experience shows that there is a constant order of succession be-
tween some of the former and some of the latter." (P. 318.) 
Now, when having closed the book and looking up, one sees a 
bunch of purple violets, delicately formed, sweetly scented, in the 
vase out there on the table, one is tempted to wonder whether, in 
following the lead of Locke and Berkeley, the high priest, or if it 
be preferred the proctor, of modern science, took the line most 
suitable for the end he had in view. That end was first the de-
limitation of scientific knowledge, and secondly the disclosure of 
the foundations on which that knowledge is securely based. Both 
the range and the basis may be summarised, on the principles he 
adopts, in the single word Experience. Beyond experience we are 
not to stray; and the clear teachings of experience we are to trust 
with absolute confidence. 
" T h e memorable service rendered to the cause of sound thinking by Descartes,' 
said Huxley, "consisted in this : that he laid the foundation of modern philosophi-
cal criticism by his inquiry into the nature of certainty. It is a clear result of the 
investigation started by Descartes, that there is one thing of which no doubt can be 
entertained, for he who should pretend to doubt it would thereby prove its exist-
ence ; and that is the momentary consciousness we call a present thought or feeling; 
that is safe, even if all other kinds of certainty are merely more or less probable 
inferences." (VI. 65, 6.) 
For my own part I confess that when, having closed the book, 
or awakened from the metaphysical reverie it has suggested, I see 
before me the bunch of violets, nothing in the whole range of my 
experience appears to be more certain and clear than the reality in 
all its details, of this present item of immediate perception. If I 
am to accept the Cartesian maxim, here and now is my opportun-
ity. Suppose that a physicist at my side undertakes to show that 
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4 THE MONIST. 
what I call the color of the violets is explicable in terms of matter 
and motion ; I listen with respectful attention. But, granting that 
every step of his argument conforms strictly to the Cartesian canon, 
it is none the less true that every step takes us farther from the 
particular reality of immediate experience from which we started. 
No doubt, our path may lead us to new realities of physical thought 
and inference. That I do not deny; what I deny is that our jour-
neying from the Land's End to Berwick-on-Tweed has altered one 
whit the reality of our experiences at the outset of our journey. 
And if the mental philosopher then offers to be my guide through 
the country of Hume, I am delighted to be his companion right up 
to John o' Groat's. I rejoice to travel in such excellent company. 
But when we get there, when not only the Land's End violets but 
the matter and motion of Berwick have faded in the indefinite dis-
tance, and become but pleasant memories, it appears to me that 
though we have taken many more steps and journeyed further from 
our starting-point, and though what we see at John o' Groat's (with 
a good pair of metaphysical spectacles) may be quite clear and 
real, yet,—there is our bunch of violets on the table. We have 
passed from the realities of immediate perception to the realities of 
physics and thence to the realities of Berkeleyan thought: but 
don't try and persuade us that these realities of abstraction carry 
with them more certitude than the immediate experience with which 
we started. I profess that, being but a plain man, the reality of 
my experience, as I look at the bunch of violets, carries with it the 
very maximum of conviction. And it appears to me that, on the 
principles of Descartes's himself, we should substitute for his cele-
brated Cogito ergo sum, concerning which as it stands very pretty 
arguments have arisen, the indisputable axiom Experientia est. 
There are some, however, who would seek to undermine the 
foundations of this belief. Mr. Balfour, for example, interprets 
the teaching of Naturalism as follows : 
' ' Whereas common sense tells us that our experience of objects provides us 
with a knowledge of their nature which so far as it goes, is immediate and direct, 
science informs us that each particular experience is itself but the final link in a 
long chain of causes and effects, whose beginning is lost amid the complexities of 
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THE REALITIES OF EXPERIENCE. 5 
the material world, and whose ending is a change of some sort in the mind of the 
percipient. It informs us further, that among these innumerable causes, the thing 
' immediately experienced' is but one ; and is, moreover, one separated from the 
'immediate experience' which it modestly assists in producing by a very large 
number of intermediate causes which are never experienced at all. . . . The fact 
that even the most immediate experiences carry with them no inherent guarantee 
of their veracity is, however, by far the smallest of the difficulties which emerge 
from a comparison of the causal movement from object to perception, with the cog-
nitive leap from perception to object. . . . For we need only to consider carefully 
our perceptions regarded as psychological results, in order to see that, regarded as 
sources of information, they are not merely occasionally inaccurate, but habitually 
mendacious. We are dealing, recollect, with a theory of science according to which 
the ultimate stress of scientific proof is thrown wholly upon our immediate percep-
tions of objects. But nine-tenths of our immediate experiences of objects are vis-
ual ; and all visual experiences, without exception, are, according to science, erron-
eous. As everybody knows, color is not a property of the thing seen : it is a sensa-
tion produced in us by that thing. The thing itself consists of uncolored particles, 
which become visible solely in consequence of their power of either producing or 
reflecting ethereal undulations. The degrees of brightness and the qualities of color 
perceived in the thing, and in virtue of which alone any visual perception of the 
thing is possible, are therefore according to optics, no part of its reality, but are 
feelings produced in the mind of the percipient by the complex movements of ma-
terial molecules, possessing mass and extension, but to which it is not only incor-
rect but unmeaning to attribute brightness or color." ' 
Mr. Balfour would seem to have written this near Berwick-on-
Tweed. But we must remember that he is merely interpreting 
what he assumes to be the creed of science. According to this 
creed, thus interpreted, our experiences at the Land's end were 
naught but an illusory dream. I refuse to admit the physical sce-
nery of this interpretation, real enough in its proper place, as a sub-
stitute for the equally real scenery of direct perception. The Land's 
end of immediate experience from which Mr. Balfour starts is a 
green tree standing in the next field. And I claim that this green 
tree is not a whit less real than " t h e complex movements of ma-
terial molecules, possessing mass and extension " which come into 
view at Berwick. We are not dealing at present, remember, with 
any of the inferences which may be drawn from the original expe-
Foundations of Belief , pp. 108, m , 112. 
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6 THE MONIST. 
rience,—with any judgment about the object. These may be true 
or false without affecting one jot the reality of the experience as 
such. We are not regarding the experience as a message. It may 
be true that, as Mr. Balfour says: 
"Anything which would distribute similar green rays on the retina of the eyes 
in the same pattern as that produced by the tree, or anything that would produce 
a like modification of the cerebral tissues, would give an experience in itself quite 
indistinguishable from the experience of the tree, although it [nay, Sir, not it but 
our interpretation of it] has the unfortunate peculiarity of being wholly incorrect 
The same message would be delivered, in the same terms and on the same author-
ity, but it would be false." 
Be it true or false, however, as a message,—as an experience 
it is unquestionably real. We either have it or do not. If we have 
it, it is real in the only intelligible meaning of this much abused 
word as applied in the affairs of practical life. We have estab-
lished our asylums for those whose terribly real experiences habit-
ually deliver false messages, that is to say messages which are for 
you and me and other normal people unverifiable and incorrect. 
It is of course open to some one to elaborate the thesis that we are 
all mad, and that this world in which we live is a glorified Bedlam. 
If so all we can do is to clap him into an asylum for the sane, and 
treat him kindly. It is on the validity of normal experience that 
we must take our stand. 
Perhaps it may seem somewhat arbitrary to select certain ex-
perience, label it normal, and assert that it is on this selected real-
ity that we must take our stand. The distinction, however, is be-
tween reality and validity. All experience, normal and abnormal 
alike, is real; but it is not all of the same social validity. If a lad 
come in on a dark night with blanched cheeks and trembling limbs 
saying that he has seen a ghost in the lane, his experience was real 
—appallingly real—but it lacks social validity. He stoutly con-
tends that if you dare face it you too will see the spectre standing 
by the bank. Curiosity impels you to go ; and you find a sheet of 
the Daily Telegraph blown by the wind against the hedge. The ex-
perience was real, but it was falsely interpreted. The dagger Mac-
beth saw was for him as real as immediate experience could make 
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THE REALITIES OF EXPERIENCE. 7 
i t : but the phantom of his overwrought brain had no social validity, 
since for others there was but vacant air. The value of experience 
is as the guide to action. It generates anticipations ; and only in 
so far as these anticipations are verifiable by others is it not only 
real but valid. 
This leads us on to our next point. What is true of an imme-
diate experience is true of any given series. Their reality lies in 
their being experienced. There is the tree in yonder green field. 
If I walk to it, touch it, inhale the fragrance of its blossoms, or, 
later in the season, enjoy the flavor of its fruit; if I run a splinter 
from it into my finger, or foolishly knock my head against its 
boughs ; if I measure its height or calculate its value ; in all of this 
there is a sequence of experiences, each of which is real for me just 
in so far as it is an actual experience. And we are able to guide 
our actions and walk more or less sure-footedly in the paths of ex-
perience, just because, as experience itself shows, the realm we 
have been exploring is an orderly realm,—orderly not only for me 
but for you. For you and I can compare notes as to our experi-
ence, whence emerges natural knowledge. 
All of this seems, no doubt, to many very elementary and trite. 
We know perfectly well, it may be said, that out there in the field 
is a tree; that if one is near enough one can see it, and if one goes 
still nearer one can handle it and taste its fruits. There is no need 
to tell us that the orderly sequence of experience is the result of 
two quite independent things,—our consciousness and the tree. 
That is mere common sense. But it must be remembered that 
common sense is a subtle compound of practical experience and 
crude metaphysics. The assumption that the unity of experience 
is the product of two independent factors, the tree and con-
sciousness, is a metaphysical assumption, and one which leads to 
all sorts of difficulties. It forces you to divide the experience be-
tween the two existences. You will perhaps begin, with Locke, by 
admitting that the color, and the sweetness, and the pain are in 
vour consciousness, while matter and extension are in the tree, 
•nay be perplexed, like readers of Huxley, with horrid 
"> matter and extension as they exist independently 
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8 THE M0N1ST. 
of the percipient mind. And you may end with the conviction that 
"what we are conscious of as properties of matter, even down to 
its weight and resistance, are but subjective affections produced by 
objective agencies which are unknown and unknowable;" and may 
be enfolded at last with the lambs that Mr. Herbert Spencer 
feeds with the metaphysical grass of transfigured Realism. Which 
Heaven forbid! for the unknowable is innutritious provender. 
But surely, the tree as object and the mind as subject are dis-
tinguishable with Cartesian clearness. Distinguishable, yes—like 
the scent and color of my violets. But it does not follow that they 
are separable. In experience they are inseparable; and if we pos-
tulate independence, we do so on metaphysical grounds. Let us 
go back to the immediate experience which I describe as a green 
tree in the field. This is our starting point. Now what we do is 
to analyse this bit of practical experience. And as the result of 
our analysis we distinguish in thought what philosophers have 
agreed to call an objective aspect, the green tree, and a subjective 
aspect, our perception. In experience the two are inseparable. 
And a system of science which is founded on experience should 
frankly accept its limitations and leave outstanding problems to 
metaphysics. If we do this; if we hold firmly, as students of science, 
to the teachings of experience and refuse, within the sphere of sci-
ence, to go beyond them; if we be careful to avoid the pernicious 
fallacy, that what is distinguishable in analysis is necessarily separ-
able in existence; then our way is comparatively clear and simple. 
Looking at our experience in its objective bearings, we elaborate 
a system of natural and physical science; looking at it in its sub-
jective bearings, we elaborate a co-ordinate system of mental sci-
ence. The question whether the color is in the tree or in our 
mind, admits of no answer from science, just because it is wrongly 
stated. It is formulated in terms of the crude dualistic metaphysics 
of common sense. Asked in an intelligible form for science, it ad-
mits of a perfectly intelligible answer. The color is certainly part 
of the objective aspect of vision and has to be investigated by n 
ural and physical science; it, as unquestionably, has a b 
the subjective interpretation of experience, and from t 
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THE REALITIES OF EXPERIENCE. 9 
view falls within the province of the psychologist. The distance 
of the tree, its size, its value, fall, in like manner, within the 
scheme of objective interpretation, from one point of view, and 
within the scheme of subjective interpretation from the other; and 
that because as items of experience they are susceptible of this 
mode of analysis. 
For science both aspects, objective and subjective, are abso-
lutely co-equal and co-ordinate in the matter of reality. It is just 
as absurd to deny objective reality as to deny the reality of experi-
ence ; the one implies the other. Science, I repeat, takes its stand 
on this reality of experience; polarises it under the magnetic influ-
ence of thought; terms all that falls within the objective purview 
the natural and physical universe, and all that falls under the sub-
jective analysis the world of mind; regarding both as co-ordinate 
realities, or, rather, coequal aspects of the basal reality of experi-
ence. 
But it may be said that the immediate experience of the bunch 
of violets, or the green tree in the field, carries with it the ineradic-
able conviction that the object is independent of the subject. In 
what sense independent? If we cross-question practical experience, 
apart from the metaphysics of common sense, does it assert with 
conviction anything beyond the range of actual or possible observa-
tion or of verifiable inference founded thereon? I cannot discover 
that it does. Experience begets expectations, and the reiterated 
verification of such expectations does carry with it a sort of convic-
tion. I am convinced that if I reach forth my hand to the violets 
and carry them to my nose, I shall experience their fragrance. I 
do not wish in any degree to minimise the force and value of such 
convictions. They are our guides in the practical conduct of life. 
Without them we could make no advances in science. At the same 
time these expectations may be misleading. The violets may be 
artificial and have been placed on my table as a practical joke. Or 
they may be dog-violets. The order of certainty—if the expression 
be allowed—of the immediate experience, as such, is different from 
that of any expectation, no matter how well founded. Experientia 
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1 0 THE MONIST. 
erit cannot be asserted with the same absolute confidence as Ex-
perientia est. 
Now, so far as I can ascertain, practical knowledge, apart from 
metaphysics, never goes beyond the assertion that experience, ac-
tual or possible, is, was, or will be, of such and such a kind. It 
asserts on the evidence of Geology that Ichthyosauri lived in the 
seas of Liassic times, and that, had men been living then, there 
would have been such and such experiences. It asserts that in the 
experience of the future, as in that of to-day, sunrise and sunset 
will continue so long as the solar system shall endure. All past 
history, all anticipations for the future, it presents in the form of 
actual or possible experience. But if we ask questions which do 
not admit of answers couched in terms of experience, inquiring, 
for example, what will be the state of matters if experience, actual 
or possible, is from the nature of the case excluded, then common 
sense either refuses to give any reply, or has resort to metaphysical 
assumptions. It is apt to assume, for instance, that because my 
experience, say of the bunch of violets, is independent of you, and 
yours of me, and ours of some actual or possible third person, the 
object, as such, is independent of any experience. That there may 
be something independent of any experience, I am not concerned 
here either to assert or to deny. Such assertion or denial must be 
based on metaphysical grounds altogether beyond the domain of 
actual observation. For the practical affairs of life the word "ob-
ject " indicates that which is given in sensory experience. Begot-
ten thus of experience, the object should resent any doubts which 
may be thrown on its legitimate parentage. I cannot believe that 
common sense ever seriously means to cast this slur on the objects 
of perception. It asserts that under given conditions of experience 
you or I, or any one else, may see and handle the violets—that as 
objects they are independent of any of us severally, not surely that 
they exist, as such, independently of all experience. 
But is not this complete independence implied in our words 
and forms of speech? Not necessarily. The function of language 
is to enable us to communicate to each other, or to record, the re-
sults of experience and of thought. Their implications are either 
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THE REALITIES OF EXPERIENCE. I I 
practical or metaphysical. Absolute independence is a metaphys-
ical implication, and differs from that practical independence which 
is a matter of common experience. If some one tells me that there 
are mile-stones on the Dover road, and that if I care to journey 
thither I shall see them, he expresses first a fact of experience, and 
secondly an anticipation based thereon. It is true that I or any 
one else can verify my informant's anticipation. This shows that 
the object is independent of merely individual experience, but it 
does not show, nor does our language necessarily imply, that, as 
objects, the mile-stones are independent of all experience. And if 
it be said that some thing, at any rate, does exist independently 
which generates or is the occasion of the several experiences of 
those who journey along the Dover road, I am certainly not pre-
pared to deny the statement; but it belongs to the domain of met-
aphysics, not to that of practical knowledge. To the question, 
What is the cause of the experience in which you trust? practical 
knowledge, apart from metaphysics, replies : That is outside my 
province. What information I have is entirely based on observa-
tion. I can offer no opinion on matters which lie behind and be-
yond it. 
I conceive that science, in so far as it is founded on practical 
experience, should make precisely the same answer. No doubt sci-
ence has carried its inferences much further afield. It deals in 
greater degree with generalisations and employs more largely the 
symbolism of abstraction. It soars on the wings of thought to more 
lofty and difficult heights. For it must not be forgotten that the 
realm of experience includes not only the domain of the senses, but 
all that can logically, with the Cartesian canon in view, be founded 
thereon. 
" Indeed the domain of the senses," asTyndall said, " is almost infinitely small 
in comparison with the vast region accessible to thought which lies beyond them. 
From a few observations of a comet when it comes within the range of his teles-
cope, an astronomer can calculate its path in regions which no telescope can reach ; 
and in like manner, by means of data furnished in the narrow world of the senses, 
we make ourselves at home in other and wider worlds, which can be traversed by 
the intellect alone." 
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12 THE MONIST. 
Just as the trigonometrical survey of a whole continent may be 
constructed from a single accurately measured base-line, so may we 
construct the vast extra-sensible world of science from the accu-
rately measured base-line of sensible experience. Science does but 
indefinitely prolong and extend the process of inference which 
common sense habitually employs in dealing with daily affairs. And 
only by oft-repeated reference to the touchstone of experience is 
the gold of valid inference distinguishable from the false coinage 
and spurious notes of fallacy. 
There is, however, another feature of scientific knowledge 
which is perhaps more frequently overlooked. It is founded on se-
lected experience. Although from the subjective aspect abnormal 
experience forms an important field for investigation, yet, in its ob-
jective aspect, science is forced to exclude it altogether. And not 
only is abnormal experience necessarily ignored (for it has no so-
cial validity), but all observations which fail to reach the standard 
of accuracy and exactness which science imposes, are for that rea-
son excluded. There is also a tendency, wise in the main but apt 
to be arbitrary, to deny the validity of all such experience as fails 
to conform to the existing conclusions of science—to ignore what-
soever seems to be discordant with our scheme of scientific inter-
pretation. This may perhaps be regarded as the besetting intel-
lectual sin of the narrow-minded devotee of science. It is a defect 
which time and increased wisdom will remedy. The ideal towards 
which we work should be that all sane and accurate experience 
shall find its appropriate place in the system of scientific knowl-
edge. 
The result, then, of the analysis of this extended system 
founded and built on experience, is to polarise it into objective 
and subjective, one in essence but diverse in aspect, of neither of 
which do we know anything apart from the other, both of strictly 
co-ordinate reality within the system. Under the objective aspect 
we classify all that we learn from astronomy, geology, biology, 
physics, and chemistry, concerning the material universe. The 
planets of the solar system, the rocks of the carboniferous age, the 
delicate pencillings on the guinea-fowl's plumage, the chasing on 
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THE REALITIES OF EXPERIENCE. 13 
the minutest diatom, are in no sense less real, for experience, than 
the orderly molecular or atomic evolutions of which the physicist 
or the chemist has to tell us. Men of science who are concerned 
with the objective take for granted the subjective aspect which all 
experience, as such, must present. That they leave to those whose 
business it is to deal with our knowledge from this point of view— 
to the psychologists, who regard the whole realm of experience as 
that which affords data for the understanding of the orderly se-
quence of states of consciousnesss. Psychologists take cognisance 
of the objective, not for its own sake, but as inevitably throwing 
light on those conscious processes which they have to explain in 
terms of their special science. Thus by an organised division of 
labor naturalists and psychologists extend the systematic survey, 
each from his selected point of view; and thus by analysis are dis-
entangled the strands which constitute the intricately-woven tap-
estry of human experience ; thus, too, in synthetic interpretation, 
does the student of history, whether of our own times or of a more 
distant past, utilise all that is rendered visible from each stand-
point, and combine actions and motives in one dramatic represen-
tation. 
Let us, however, in surveying the edifice of human knowledge, 
be careful not to lose sight of the foundations. These are the com-
mon experiences of daily life—the data afforded by observation. 
Just in so far as these are real and valid, will the superstructure 
have reality and validity. Any system of thought which conveys 
the notion that they are tainted with unreality is false to the prin-
ciples of experience and of science. The corner-stone of the whole 
building has inscribed upon it the axiom Experientia est. If my ex-
perience of the bunch of violets be not real and trustworthy down 
to its minutest and apparently most trivial detail, then there is 
nothing in the vast system of scientific knowledge which can resist 
the solvent acid of philosophical scepticism, leaving but the phan-
tom dregs of the Unknowable. 
And so we come back to Huxley's line of argument founded 
on the Berkeleyan analysis. What shall we say of it? Is it true 
or false ? Shall we evade the question and answer indirectly that 
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it is ill-chosen? Or may we not take refuge in an oxymoron ? No 
one was more desirous than Huxley of doing honor to science. But 
in these Berkeleyan essays 
' ' His honor rooted in dishonor stood 
And faith unfaithful kept him falsely true." 
If he wished to make a desert of the Unknowable so that the divine 
Astraea of philosophic peace should commence her blessed reign, 
he adopted a strangely ill-advised method of realising his desires. 
Hear again the words in which he summarises his conclusions : 
'' Our sensations, our pleasures, our pains, and the relations of these make up 
the sum total of positive, unquestionable knowledge. We call a large section of 
these sensations and their relations matter and motion ; the rest we term mind and 
thinking ; and experience shows that there is a constant order of succession between 
some of the former and some of the latter." 
I venture to deny the validity of this division into two separate 
sections, material and mental. The body of experience is one and 
homogeneous, and every item presents to analysis two aspects. But 
let that pass. The passage is open to a more serious criticism. Bear-
ing in mind the way in which Huxley hunts down the objectivities, 
hounding first the secondary qualities, and then those once termed 
primary, until they take refuge in the safe haven of the subjective, 
is it unjust to paraphrase his conclusions as follows? Only the 
subjective aspect of experience can make good at the bar of reason 
its title to reality : the objective universe is at best but an orderly 
mental phantasmagoria. 
Now this conclusion came naturally enough from the lips of a 
professed mental philosopher like Berkeley. It was indeed a one-
sided conclusion. It was elaborated in the subjective field ; but it 
exercised in its own proper sphere no little influence on the devel-
opment of modern philosophic thought. It established triumph-
antly the subjective aspect as present in all experience throughout 
its whole range. And if in its vivid realisation of this aspect it 
seemed to minimise the value of the correlative objective aspect, 
the fault may well be condoned—in Berkeley. With Huxley the 
case is different. What was seemly, nay admissible, in the Bishop 
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of Cloyne may scarcely befit the proctor of modern science. I have 
a sincere admiration of Huxley's work and genius. But when, 
having discoursed with enviable lucidity on the physical basis of 
life and mind, he finally merges the object in the subject, he is no 
longer true to the flag of experience under which he professed to 
serve. The following words are the utterance of a deserter : " I f 
I say that thought is a property of matter, all that I can mean is 
that actually or possibly the consciousness of extension and that of 
resistance accompany all other sorts of consciousness." The ideal-
ism of the explanation is as absurd as the materialism it professes 
to explain. Does any true soldier of science believe that his cap-
tain here spoke wisely and well ? I for one must protest, even if I 
be drummed out of the service for sowing the seeds of disaffection 
to a superior officer whose memory is justly revered. But before I 
am ignominiously stripped of my uniform I must repeat that the 
objective and the subjective are the co-ordinate products of the 
analysis of experience, and that the one is as real (and real in pre-
cisely the same sense) as the other. If we polarise the experience 
of a bunch of flowers into objective violets and subjective states of 
consciousness, we cannot doubt the reality of either without deny-
the reality of the experience thus polarised. 
And what good purpose, it may be asked, can be served by 
this discussion ? The question at issue is of very little if any prac-
tical moment. Notwithstanding all that the Bishop of Cloyne and 
the philosopher of Ninewells have written, in spite of the arguments 
of their spiritual progenitor Locke and their nineteenth-century in-
terpreter Huxley, men of science have quietly and steadily pursued 
their researches, and the general public have accepted and profited 
by their labors without misgivings. But if we found our knowl-
edge on experience, we must be prepared either to hold Huxley's 
position or to abandon it and occupy more advantageous ground. 
No doubt in times of peace we may be content to retain the posi-
tion in a merely formal manner, without considering its strength or 
its weakness. It will then afford no little gratification to onlookers 
when in times of attack the enemy's shot destroy our crumbling 
walls and force us to beat a retreat. If one may judge from the 
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comments of the press, this was the attitude of many, when Mr. 
Balfour opened a vigorous and well-directed fire on what seemed 
to the field-glasses of the attacking party the chief positions of nat-
uralism. 
Choosing his ground with all the skill of a trained dialectician, 
and selecting for his most concentrated fire a position in itself in-
herently weak, Mr. Balfour affords to onlookers a view of some 
very pretty artillery practice : 
" Naturalism (as commonly held), he says, is deeply committed to the distinc-
tion between the frimary and the secondary qualities of matter; the former (ex-
tension, solidity, and so forth) being supposed to exist as they are perceived, while 
the latter (such as sound and color) are due to the action of the primary qualities 
upon the sentient organism, and apart from the sentient organism have no indepen-
dent being." (Foundations of Belief, p. 42.) 
Then, in the passage already quoted, he argues that, on this 
view, our perceptions regarded as sources of information, are not 
merely occasionally inaccurate but habitually mendacious. And a 
little further on he asks : 
' ' By what possible title can we proclaim the same immediate experience to be 
right when it testifies to the independent reality of something solid and extended, 
and to be wrong when it testifies to the independent reality of something illumin-
ated and colored." (P. 113.) 
Having captured this position and advanced on one more 
closely resembling that s t rengthened and fortified by Huxley, h e 
places a telling shot when he says that— 
" I t involves a complete divorce between the practice of science and its theory. 
It is all very well," he continues, "to say that the scientific account of mental phys-
iology in general, and of sense-perception in particular, requires us to hold that 
what is immediately experienced are mental facts, and that our knowledge of phys-
ical facts is but mediate and inferential. Such a conclusion is quite out of harmony 
with its own premises, since the proposition on which, as a matter of historical 
verity, science is ultimately founded are not propositions about states of mind, but 
about material things. . . . So that, if this particular account of the nature of ex-
perience be accurate, the system of thought represented by science presents the 
singular spectacle of a creed which is believed in practice for one set of reasons, 
though in theory it can only be justified by another; and which, through some 
beneficent accident, turns out to be true, though its origin and each subsequent 
stage in its gradual development are the product of error and illusion." 
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Finally surveying the ruins of the captured fort, Mr. Balfour 
exclaims: 
"Nothing in the history of speculation is more astonishing, nothing—if I am 
to speak my whole mind—is more absurd than the way in which Hume's philo-
sophic progeny—a most distinguished race—have, in spite of all their differences, 
yet been able to agree, both that experience is essentially as Hume described it, 
and that from such an experience can be rationally extracted anything even in the 
remotest degree resembling the existing system of the natural sciences." (Pp. 
96, 97) 
I have recalled to the reader's memory these strategic advances 
of a powerful and avowed enemy to Naturalism as a philosophy, 
partly with the object of showing that the position in which Huxley 
entrenched himself was regarded by one who had no narrow and 
petty cause to fight for, as a position of importance and worth cap-
turing, and partly with a view to indicating that Mr. Balfour's logi-
cal projectiles have not pierced or weakened the central citadel of 
experience. For if there be any truth in the conclusions set forth 
in the preceding pages, Mr. Balfour has only succeeded in taking 
outposts which the captains of experience should never have occu-
pied. If he have forced the soldiers of science to fall back upon 
more tenable ground, and compelled them to defend the co-ordin-
ate reality of the objective and subjective in all their details, he 
will, in my judgment, have done them a signal service. The po-
sition of naturalism will be the stronger for his spirited attack. 
By naturalism I here mean a system of knowledge founded on 
experience in its widest and most comprehensive sense. Within 
that system experience may be trusted implicitely as far as it goes 
—and no farther. Although it may occasionally lead to false in-
ferences, it is not habitually inaccurate, still less mendacious. Only 
when dealing with problems outside its proper sphere does it talk 
nonsense. It is by no means a complete system of knowledge, but 
is full of gaps, and ends off in ragged edges. It does not afford an 
explanation of the universe. Nay, I am prepared to go further and 
assert that experience does not and cannot furnish a philosophical 
explanation of anything, its r61e being to describe the past and 
anticipate the future. It deals with sequences which, under the 
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appropriate conditions, it finds to be practically invariable. And 
if it commonly speaks of the causes of events, when it should be 
content with describing their antecedents, it is but borrowing, con-
sciously or unconsciously, the language of metaphysics. Experi-
ence of past sequences enables us to predict the future in similar 
terms. There its guidance ceases. In presence of the problem of 
causation it is smitten with the dumbness of agnosticism. 
And beyond the babble of experience all is silence! On what 
men of thought in all ages have regarded as the deepest problems 
of existence we are to ask no questions, or at any rate are to expect 
no answers! I, for one, am unable to assent to these propositions. 
I do indeed contend that the whole edifice of scientific knowledge 
is securely founded on the realities of experience. If, however, I 
be asked whether I am content to accept the universe as inexplic-
able, I have no hesitation in replying that I am not. Behind the 
sequential realities of experience I believe in a causal reality which 
makes that experience possible and explicable. But, as Mr. Rud-
yard Kipling would say, that is another story. 
C. LLOYD MORGAN. 
BRISTOL, ENGLAND. 
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